LEIGH v. DICKESON.

considered to have a quasi lien ; a right to have as much of it as
may be necessary to satisfy his claim applied to its payment when
it becomes due.
Granting the correctness of this view it is evident that a voluntary conveyance by a debtor is an attempt to deprive his creditors
of their rights and is a fraud against them, and it is at once seen to
be true that as Lord HARDWICKE said, "A man actually indebted.
conveying voluntarily, always means to be in fraud of creditors."
According to this view conveyances to children must be placed upon
an equality with those to strangers.
A man may be tempted to steal, by a desire to benefit his wife
and children, but if he yields to the temptation, the desire to benefit
his family will not make his act honest. "I have always," says
Lord HARDWICKE, "a great compassion for wife and children,
yet, on the other side, it is possible, if creditors should not have
their debts, their wives and children may be reduced to want."
In those cases in which the view taken in Reade v. zivingston
has been dissented from, the idea seems to be that a debtor has a
right-to do what he pleases with his property, so long as his object
and intent are not fraudulent. Where this view is adopted the only
remaining question is as to when, if ever, a fraudulent intent should
be conclusively presumed. It is evident that if debtors have a
right to give away their property, there is no reason why a fraudulent intent should be inferred from the mere fact of the existence of
previous indebtedness, where a voluntary conveyance is made to a
near relative, by one whose circumstances justify him in making it,
and who retains property amply sufficient to pay his debts. Hence
if the latter theory be the correct one the rule in Salmon v. Bennett
is unassailable.
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LEIGH v. DICKESON.
One tenant in common is not entitled to recover from his co-tenant contribution
in respect of repairs done to the common property, although such repairs may have
been reasonable and necessary. The proper remedy is by a partition suit, in which
the court will take into account all proper expendiure upon the property.

LEIGH v. DICKESON.
The defendant was assignee of a lease granted by the plaintiff to one P. of an
undivided three-fourths of certain premises to which the plaintiff was entitled as
tenant in common with another. During the lease the defendant purchased the onefourth interest of the plaintiff's co-tenant. On the expiration of the lease, the defendant continued in the occupation of the above three-fourths as tenant at sufferance
to the plaintiff. Held, that notwithstanding the tenancy in common, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover in respect of the use and occupation by the defendant of the
undivided three-fourths.

APPEAL by the defendant from a judgment of POLLOcK, B.
In 1860, Mrs. Eyles (then Mrs. Worger) was entitled to an undivided three-fourths of a house in Market-lane, Dover, as tenant
in common with another; and on the 4th of Januilry in that year,
Mrs. Worger, by lease, let to one Prebble, for twenty-one years, her
interest at the rent of 331. 15s. per annum. This lease contained
a covenant on the part of the tenant to execute internal repairs,
and, on the part of Mrs. Worger, to execute external repairs.
In 1865 the lease was assigned by Prebble to the defendant, who
entered and paid rent. In 1871, the defendant purchased the onefourth interest of the other tenant in common.
On the 6th of January 1881, the lease expired, and the defendant continued in possession. A correspondence then took place
with a view to continue the tenancy, but the plaintiffs, the trustees
of Mrs. Eyles, asking for an advanced rent, which the defendant
was unwilling to pay, no further agreement was effected. The present action was then brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the
defendant the sum of 241. 9s. 6d. for the use and occupation by the
defendant of three-fourths of the premises in Market-lane for 264
days, at the rate of 381. 15s. per annum, and also three-quarters'
rent of a piece of land and buildings at the rear of it.
The defendant set up a counter-claim in respect of a sum of 801.,
which he alleged he had expended in substantial and other proper
repairs and improvements upon the premises.
The action was tried before POLLOCK, B., who, upon further consideration, gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the claim for 241.
9s. 6d., and also upon the counter-claim.
The defendant appealed.
Finlay, Q. C., and 0. A. Russell, for the appellant.
Grantham, Q. C., and Gore, for the respondents.
BRETT, M. R.-In this case the plaintiffs' cestui que trust, Mrs.
Eyles, and defendant were tenants in common of a house. The
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defendant has done certain repairs which may be taken to have
been reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the house.
Thereupon he has paid the cost of the repairs, and has set up a
counter-claim against the plaintiffs, the trustees of the co-owner, to
recover her share, proportionate to her interest, of the money so
paid. That is the substance of the counter-claim. Therefore this
is a case in which one person has expended money, and thereupon
sues another person to recover that money. The question is whether the circumstances of the case will bring the case within any
recoguised principle of law which will entitle the defendant to recover against the plaintiffs. It is not pretended that there was any
express request by Mrs. Eyles to the defendant to do the repairs or
to expend any money on her behalf. What are the legal conditions
which entitle a person, who has paid or expended money, to recover
that money from another? If the plaintiff in such a case has expended money at the express request of the defendant, there can
be no doubt. If the plaintiff has been appointed agent for the
defendant in such a class of business as requires an expenditure of
his money in order to carry on the business, there is no doubt as to
that. The law has gone further, and has said that, although there
may be no request from the defendant to the plaintiff in point of
fact, nor any act appointing him his agent, yet if the defendant
requests the plaintiff to do that which will impose upon the plaintiff a liability, according to law, to pay money, then the law will
imply from that request a promise that, if the plaintiff has laid
himself under the obligation to pay the money, and has paid it, the
defendant will repay the money. The law has lately been extended
still further, and it has been decided that if you request a person
to pay money in such circumstances that, though the law will not
compel him to pay, yet that if he does not there will be an injury
to him in his business or social position, even although that business
is not recognised in law, the law will imply a promise to repay.
That was an extreme case, in my opinion, but it was so decided.
It is equally-clear, however, that the law has always been that, for
a mere voluntary payment, a person cannot compel repayment
from any one else, and if the payment was merely voluntary you
cannot make another person repay you, on the ground that your
money was expended for his benefit, and that he has reaped the
benefit of it. If one person pays money voluntarily for anotherin
such circumstances that the other is at liberty to accept or reject
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the advantage and he accepts it, then, although the payment was
voluntary, he adopts and ratifies what was done for him and becomes
liable. But if the money is voluntarily expended in such circumstances that the other is obliged to reap the advantage of it, then
his accepting what he was not at liberty to refuse is no evidence of
adoption or ratification, and therefore the other must suffer for his
generosity.
The question is under which head this case comes. There is a
house in which these persons have interests, which, although independent, are in fact combined. The defendant expended money on
the property for the purpose of putting it into repair. That, in
the first instance, was most certainly a voluntary payment. He was
not requested, and there was nothing in the relation of the parties to give him an authority from the other to expend the money.
They were not partners: there was nothing in their relation which
made one the agent of the other. It was a voluntary payment on
the part of the defendant, partly for his own interest, and partly
for the advantage of his co-owner. But then it was an advantage
which the other could not reject. Therefore the money was voluntarily expended by the defendant. It was an expenditure of which
the plaintiff would get the advantage, but without the liberty to
accept or refuse that advantage. Therefore the case is within the
principle I have mentioned, and the money is not recoverable. At
the common law it cannot be recovered as money paid. That is a
legal remedy, and if it could be recovered in that way, a court of
equity would never have interfered. But there is in this matter a
remedy which is entertained by the Court of Chancery. When
parties are joined together as co-owners, and they have come to a
final disagreement, the Court of Chancery divorces them in a suit
for partition, and then does justice between them. In such a suit,
this expenditure would be taken into account and regulated between'
the parties. An old writ was cited which looked like a commonlaw writ. As far as I understand it, it would be a mandatory writ.
I think the proper way to deal with it is to say that it is obsolete,
because, as a common writ, it was unworkable, and therefore the
matter went to chancery, there being no adequate remedy at law.
They took possession ;f such matters only by writ of partition, and
that is the only known remedy in such a case. The strongest evidence that that is so is that, having had the assistance of my learned
brothers and of the counsel on both sides, no case has been found,
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either at common law or in equity, where one co-owner has been
made to pay, as this defendant requires the plaintiff to pay, except
in case of a partition suit; and yet .this very dispute must have
been raised over and over again, and probably is the reason why the
court entertains partition suits. If any further reason can be required, it is that, if we upheld such an action, it would enable a
,part owner to put upon his co-owner expenses which he might be,
for reasons good or bad, unwilling to incur. I am, therefore, clearly
of opinion, that this counter-claim cannot be maintained, and that
the appeal must be dismissed.
COTToN, L. J.-I
am of the same opinion. The action was to
recover rent, and there was a counter-claim by the defendant for
certain sums of money expended on the repair of the house. As
regards the rent, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs are right. The
defendant says that in ordinary circumstances one tenant in common cannot recover rent from the other tenant in common in possession. Both may enjoy the property, and the one in possession,
unless the other is ousted, is not liable for rent. But here the defendant was not originally tenant in common, but he was in possession under a lease.' After the expiration of the lease he continued
in possession, and before the lease terminated there had been a correspondence about rent and a question as to what amount was to be
paid. In those circumstances, when the defendant held continuously under the lease, he must be considered as holding exclusive
possession, and, therefore, he was in my opinion, properly held
liable to the plaintiffs for rent.
Then, as to the repairs, the question arises upon demurrer to the
statement of defence. We cannot tell what the repairs were; but
it is stated that the house was in a bad state of repair, and that the
defendant expended money in substantial and other proper repairs
and improvements upon the premises. I think we must take it that
sums of money were expended in necessary repairs for the purpose
of keeping the house in tenantable condition. As to the improvements, it was suggested that they should be allowed ; but we need
not discuss that, because no tenant in common is entitled to improve
common property and then say that his co-tenant is to pay him the
cost of improvements done without his request.
As to the repairs, no doubt where there are two persons under a
common obligation, and one discharges it, the other, on whose be-
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half the money has been expended, is liable to him. But one of
two tenants in common does not stand in that position to the other,
even as regards necessary repairs. There being no suggested request, express or implied, I can see in principle no ground for sayin' that any common-law action will lie, nor that equity will allow
any claim, except in the case I have mentioned, by one tenant in
common against another for repairs.
It was suggested that in Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium there is
a common-law writ of contribution as between tenants in common.
On looking at it, however, I find that it assumes 4n obligation on
tenants in common to do repairs, for at page 162 it says, " To the
King and the sheriff * * * if A. shall make you secure * * *

then summon * * * B. and C., that they be at W. to show wherefore, whereas they, the said A., B. and C., jointly hold a certain
mill undivided in N., and are bound to the reparation and support
of the same mill, and the said B. and 0. * * * refuse to contribute
to the reparation and support of the said mill, to the great damage
of the said A., as he saith."
That, probably, way be a writ referring to a case where there
was an obligation by tenure, or otherwise, to repair a mill, and one
of the persons under such common obligation refused to fulfil it.
But that does not apply to a case like the present. No doubt in
Coke on Littleton (200b) we find he refers to the writ in this way :"If two tenants in common, or joint tenants, be of a house or mill,
and it fall in decay, and the one is willing to repair the same and
the other will not, he that is willing shall have a writ de reparatione facienda, and the writ saith, ad reparationen et sustentationem ejusdem domus teneatur, whereby it appeareth that owners
are in that case bound pro bono publico to maintain houses and
mills which are for habitation and use of men." I cannot but think
that he has mistaken the writ in Fitzherbert. If the sole owner
of a house is not under any obligation to repair, I cannot see how
joint owners are. In my opinion there arises no difficulty from the
writ mentioned in Fitzherbert. It is not the case, however, that
there is no remedy at all. There is no remedy so long as two tenants in common are willing to enjoy the property in its existing
state. Unless there i's an express or implied request the one cannot
recover against the other. But there is a remedy in a partition suit. In
the decrees in such suits it is common to have an inquiry whether
one tenant has expended money in the repair or improvement of
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the property. So long as both parties are agreed to enjoy the property as tenants in common there can be no common-law action,
and, therefore, no action in equity in order to make one contribute.
But where one tenant in common desires to put an end to that state
of things, and asks the other for a partition or sale of the property,
then the property is to be held in a different way; the money derived from the sale is directly increased by the expenditure incurred
for the benefit or improvement of the property, or, if there is a
division of the property in specie, the property to be divided is
increased. Therefore, if the property is to be divided and enjoyed
in a different way, the one who has not contributed at all, and was
not bound to contribute, cannot take the property increased in
value, or the increase in the amount in money, without making an
allowance to his co-tenant. It may be that it is considered that
what has been done is adopted by taking the improved value or the
improved state of 'the property in severalty. But it is confined to
a partition suit. There is, therefore, a remedy which is available
if the tenants in common cannot agree, and it is a sufficient and
the only remedy.
LirI)LEY,

L. J., delivered a concurring opinion.

1. In-this country also it is well settled
that at common law one tenant in common cannot recover of a co-tenant any
part of the amount expended in making
repairs, however reasonable and necessary, merely from his relation as co-tenant, and without any express or implied
request or promise : Converse v. Ferre,
11 Mass. 326, PARKER, C. J. ; Calvertv.
Aldrich, 99 Id. 74, in which a very satisfactoryopinion is given by FOSTER, J.
And it would seem that no action at
law lies by one tenant in common against
another for damages sustained by the defendant's neglect to repair; certainly not
without a previous request to repair,
there being no e, clusive obligation on the
defendant to make the repairs : Doane v.
Badgqer, 12 Mass. 65; Mumfordv.Brown,
6 Cow. 475.
If this be so as to tenants in common,
strictly speaking, it seems still more obvious where two persons own in severalty
VoL. XXXI.-64

two distinct parts of a house ; as when
A. owns the lower portion, and B. the
upper part, including the roof. In such
case if .4. refuses to join with B. in repairing the roof, and B. repairs it at his
own expense, he cannot recover any part
of such necessary expenditure from A. :
Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 574. And see
Cheeseborough v. Green, 10 Conn. 318.
But the doctrine of contribution in
equity is more ample than at law, and is
founded on the principle that when parties stand in tequali jure, equality of
burthen becomes equity.
And so
if repairs be made and paid for by one
of the tenants for the common benefit of
the others, in equity, they would be held
to contribute ratably for such useful expenses. And not only would they be
personally liable to contribution, but their
estates also would be subject to a lien,
whether the tenants agreed to repair or
not, if by the repairs a common benefit

